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POLICY CONCLUSIONS
• Effective veriﬁcation systems are more likely to emerge from the concerted efforts of all the major stakeholders to jointly 
resolve a shared problem, rather than from a technical solution designed by only a few. 
• In the FLEGT case, NGOs and the private sector need to be actively involved in the design and implementation of the 
veriﬁcation system. This will enhance credibility and ‘ownership’. 
• Consensus emerges as a key principle of decision-making, notwithstanding its tendency to lengthen time-frames for 
decision making.
• Firm rules on non-compliance and the threat of negative sanctions (such as exclusion from the process) increase 
credibility. 
• Issues of power are likely to exert a critical inﬂuence on monitoring systems; dispersal of power within the veriﬁcation 
body (for example, through a layered system of decision making) is conducive to success. 
• A peer review system of monitoring is strongly indicated where credibility and trust are low. 
• Above all, it is helpful for all major stakeholders to share a common understanding of the problem to be solved; in this 
respect, FLEGT’s multiple aims present a particular challenge for veriﬁcation system design.  
The European Union (EU) is seeking to control the provenance of timber and products entering the EU market, through its 
Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan. Under FLEGT, Voluntary Partnership Agreements 
(VPAs) will be signed with interested producer states, and these will involve the latter establishing ‘timber legality assurance 
systems’ to guarantee the legality of their production and associated trade. This paper oﬀers a contribution to the process 
of developing FLEGT, drawing on case studies from outside the forest sector. Using a ‘discursive institutional analysis 
approach’ it distinguishes four dimensions that characterise partnerships: actors, rules, power and discourses. Using these 
building blocks, it abstracts some of the key principles for veriﬁcation system design.
Introduction
The issue of illegal forest operations and associated trade 
has recently come to the fore in the international dialogue 
on sustainable forest management. EU policy now puts the 
emphasis on demand-side measures as a way of encouraging 
legal production as well as promoting wider governance 
reforms. The FLEGT Action Plan was proposed in 2003 and 
led, in 2006, to the adoption of EU FLEGT Regulation. This 
establishes a licensing scheme for the imports of timber into 
the Community.  The way is now open for EU delegations 
to negotiate VPAs with the Community’s main timber 
supplying countries. A key component of a VPA is the 
Timber Legality Assurance System (TLAS). This provides 
a guarantee from the partner country that only legal timber 
will be exported to the EU from its territory. Under the EU 
proposals, a TLAS will consist of ﬁve components: a legality 
deﬁnition, chain of custody control, veriﬁcation system and 
issuing of licences, and independent monitoring (see Box 
One). 
The requirement for independent monitoring is a 
potential source of controversy. The preferred European 
option appears to be the appointment of an independent 
Pieter van Midwoud and Arend Jan van Bodegom
Summary
December 2006
2monitor, who will provide oversight of the whole system 
(including the performance of the industry and the 
supervisory role of the state), and attest to its credibility 
and transparency. This is a demanding role, as each 
monitor will have to:
• distinguish clearly between legal and illegal timber; 
• secure the credibility of the TLAS;
• exercise a degree of control over an intergovernmental 
agreement.
The third element is particularly contentious as, 
due to the voluntary and bilateral nature of each VPA, 
monitoring under a TLAS will be unidirectional. This 
means that the monitor will eﬀectively be asked to review 
and comment upon the activities of a sovereign state. This 
diﬀers from most international agreements, where the 
underlying relationship is a reciprocal one and monitors 
operate on behalf of the collectivity.
How can independent monitoring under the TLAS 
be shaped in such a way that it is credible, feasible and 
cost-eﬀective, while also being politically acceptable to 
the various parties involved?  In order to provide some 
tentative answers to this question, the Netherlands 
Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality 
commissioned a review of independent monitoring in 
other sectors to look for guidance from extra-sectoral 
experience. An inventory was made of eleven forms of 
partnership, of which three are presented here1:
• The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) operated 
under the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD);
• The Kimberley Process to combat trade in conﬂict 
diamonds; 
• The Dutch integral chain management certiﬁcate 
system for pigs, ‘IKB’. 
Methodology
The objective of this desk review was to formulate 
recommendations for monitoring of TLAS within the 
framework of EU VPAs.  In relation to each of the three 
extra-sectoral cases, three questions were posed:
• How was the sovereignty dimension handled?
• How eﬀective was the independent monitoring 
arrangement in raising the credibility of the system?
• How were the intangible elements (for example, 
‘illegality’ and ‘welfare’) measured and assessed?
The analytical framework adopted for the review was 
the ‘policy arrangement’ approach (see Van Tatenhove et 
al, 2000). This distinguishes complex partnerships (also 
referred to as ‘arrangements’) in terms of four dimensions:
a) The actors and coalitions, including the organisations 
created by the arrangement.
b) The rules, which determine the way in which actors can 
participate in the arrangement (formal laws and regulations 
and also informal procedures for policy making)
c) The power and resources: power balance, diﬀerences in 
power, information and knowledge. 
d) The discourses of the actors and coalitions: the verbal 
interchange of ideas; these ideas give meaning to 
physical and social realities. 
Methods used included study of available documents, 
interviews with informants and (in the IKB case) review of 
practical experience. This triangulation of sources and methods 
allows the researcher to abstract key elements from diverse 
processes as a basis for their subsequent comparison, and can be 
anticipated to result in a generally high reliability of ﬁndings.
1- Actors
In terms of actors, an important variable is the role of 
government.
TLAS arrangements are still at an early preparatory 
stage, but the European Commission has indicated that the 
TLAS, as part of the VPA, should be an inter-governmental 
agreement, and the initial negotiations will be conﬁdential. 
It has to convince its governmental partners in timber 
producing countries that the TLAS are worth the investment, 
and also that the stages proposed are necessary ones. Some 
of the producing countries consider the emphasis on 
independent monitoring as indicative of lack of trust. 
The conﬁdentiality of the process risks marginalising 
two other players with a critical interest in, and capacity to 
inﬂuence, the TLAS.  A lot of the companies active in the 
timber sector worldwide are trying to make sure that their 
product chain is a legal one, through chain of custody and 
other veriﬁcation methods. But, to date, the private sector 
has hardly been visible in the negotiations on the TLAS. 
Likewise, NGOs are potentially powerful actors in the timber 
sector but not part of the negotiations. While their role in 
the TLAS and their monitoring cannot yet be predicted, it is 
clear that they will demand a place at the table. 
Box 1: The EU Timber Legality Assurance System 
(TLAS)
EU FLEGT Brieﬁng Notes No. 9 lays out the EU’s view 
of the TLAS. Five basic elements are proposed:
1. A deﬁnition of legally produced timber that 
identiﬁes the laws and regulations that must be 
complied with.
2. A secure chain of custody to track the timber and 
products through from harvest to the point of 
export. 
3. A veriﬁcation system that provides a reasonable 
assurance that all the requirements have been 
met for each consignment.
4. The issuance of licences to validate the results of 
legality veriﬁcation and chain of custody.
5. Independent monitoring of the whole system to 
assure its credibility and to provide transparency. 
Source: ‘A Timber Legality Assurance System’, 
Brussels, September 2005
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/development/body/theme/
forest/initiative/docs/FLEGT%20briefs%20EN9.pdf
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• The Kimberley Process: Most of the diamond trading 
countries came together to ﬁnd a solution to the 
problem of conﬂict diamonds, and agreed that only 
joint action could put a stop to the illegal trade. The 
process was encouraged by pressure from the G8 and 
UN, who were also important players. The private 
sector and NGOs were heavily involved right from 
the start, with NGOs being particularly inﬂuential, 
having brought the issue to global attention. During 
the negotiations, they formed a powerful coalition 
that kept the process under constant pressure. Like 
the private sector, they were given the ﬂoor during the 
meetings and were active in the working groups and 
review teams. 
• APRM: This started with all participating governments 
coming together within the framework of NEPAD, 
and the peer review mechanism grew out of this. 
Civil society and the private sector were not really 
involved in the creation of the APRM. However, civil 
society has been very active in the implementation of 
the reviews.  By contrast, the private sector has had 
little involvement in the APRM projects or reviews, 
although it was invited to participate.
• IKB: This was a private sector initiative and the 
government had no formal role, though European 
legislation was critical in setting the scene. The 
private sector wanted to set up a new product 
standard and all operators in the chain were 
approached to participate. Under the impact of 
a series of food crises and growing pressure from 
globalising markets, there was a shift of power in 
the chain from equal promotion by all operators to 
domination by supermarkets. In this instance, it was 
because the meat consumers had lost their trust in 
the industry after various crises (greatly decreasing 
demand for meat) that the supermarkets intervened. 
Eager to regain consumer conﬁdence, they wanted 
to guarantee the safest meat possible and speciﬁcally 
demanded IKB certiﬁcation.  NGOs were involved 
in the round table discussions that led to the creation 
of the IKB certiﬁcate, but their contribution was not 
appreciated by other stakeholders who felt they were 
setting the standards too high. The NGOs left the 
process, but the system is still there, and has survived 
the rejection. 
Through these processes, new institutions were created. 
• The APRM has a four layered structure: the heads of 
state, the panel of eminent persons, a secretariat and a 
team that takes care of the reviews. 
• Similarly, the IKB has a group of stakeholders 
accredited by the Council for Accreditation. An 
independent company issues the certiﬁcates and 
another independent company takes care of the 
control, both of them being formally accredited.
• The Kimberley structure is ﬂatter, with only a 
participation committee to check on the compliance 
of (new) members. This has kept the bureaucracy light 
and limited the demands on resources.
The institutional structure of the TLAS is still under 
negotiation.
Credibility is a crucial issue. In the APRM (which, in 
principle, uses the same kind of review as the Kimberley 
process), monitoring has not yet established the credibility 
of the system. The peer reviews in the APRM are a tool 
of the governments to control each other and to prove 
to each other – but not necessarily other stakeholders - 
that they are making eﬀorts to reform. A similar situation 
arises with the IKB. Here the main negotiating group 
are the entrepreneurs in the pig meat chain. They have 
agreed that an independent party should monitor their 
partnerships, to increase external credibility. Finally, in the 
Kimberley process, all of the groups have a considerable 
stake, although governments are in formal terms the ones 
that take the decisions. This process has credibility with 
governments, the private sector and NGOs. This does 
not mean that there is no criticism (some NGOs publish 
very critical reports), but the process has sustained its 
overall credibility. 
2- Rules
The functioning of the TLAS will be broadly laid down in 
a set of guiding principles to be identiﬁed by the EU, and 
used by its negotiating delegations. As in the other cases, 
the TLAS is an agreement in which actors work on a 
basis of equity. However, the EU is proactively proposing 
independent monitoring, though this does not necessarily 
meet with the approval of the partner governments and 
stakeholders. It thus diﬀers from the other cases in that 
equity could already be considered as compromised to a 
certain extent. 
The three external cases
All three extra-sectoral partnerships involve agreements 
on intangible elements, such as animal welfare, legal 
diamonds and good governance. The intangibles they 
have to implement are not necessarily measured further 
down the chain, but the manufacturer has to state that 
they comply with them. Should non-compliance be 
proven, the manufacturer loses its membership and 
credibility.
• APRM: Joining is voluntary but the tasks are quite 
precise and include the submission of an action plan 
and implementation of diﬀerent kinds of reviews. The 
ultimate rule concerning content is that in the APRM, 
the ‘traditional governments’ have to work towards 
good governance.  The vehicle is peer pressure.
• IKB: The legislative framework is full of formal laws 
and regulations, set by Europe and the Netherlands. 
The chain of production is regularly checked 
for compliance by governmental agencies. Non-
compliance leads to heavy ﬁnes. To increase the 
eﬃciency of their controls, the controlling agencies 
make use of the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control 
Point (HACCP) system, which identiﬁes points of 
high risk and seeks to control them. The IKB certiﬁcate 
requires extra measures to be taken by entrepreneurs, 
such as rules on transport and farm visits of outsiders. 
The checking of the certiﬁcate is also more frequent 
than with the government, about three times a year. 
Non-compliance with the IKB doesn’t lead to ﬁnancial 
penalties (unlike the government controls), but can 
lead to cancellation of the certiﬁcate, which is a strong 
4threat since all downstream marketing depends on it. 
• The Kimberley Process: Within the process, governments 
involved in the diamond trade agree to trade only with 
co-signatories. This has turned out to be a relatively 
eﬀective measure to make countries implement the 
regulations. The peer reviews check the compliance of 
the members, and reports are made to the Participation 
Committee. A strong regulatory framework was not 
anticipated at the inception of the Kimberley Process 
Certiﬁcation Scheme. Over the years, however, 
the eﬀorts of the working groups and informal 
consultations have led to more ambitious demands 
and more detailed operations, with clear rules on 
compliance. The principle that kept the process alive 
in the early days was that all decisions would be taken 
by consensus. At ﬁrst, parties feared that no agreements 
would be reached, but in the event, it has helped keep 
the agreement on track through some diﬃcult times.
3- Power
Power relations in the early stages of the TLAS are clear: 
the TLAS is to be negotiated between governments. 
The character of the negotiations is inter-governmental 
and civil society and private sector are not (or not yet) 
formally part of the negotiations. This approach is not 
encountered in any of the other cases. The research did 
not ﬁnd any evidence that the private sector wanted to 
be more involved in the TLAS, though there is certainly 
demand from the NGOs. NGOs cannot be excluded 
from the wider arena anyway, as they are active on illegal 
logging and exert an inﬂuence over public perceptions. 
Their main fear is that the TLAS will not be able to 
guarantee legal timber and that illegal timber will be 
imported in the EU via third, non-partner countries, 
over which (given the rules of diplomacy) the EU has no 
control. 
• The Kimberley process: From the outset, the NGOs and 
industry were important stakeholders and the NGOs 
were able to exploit the fear of a boycott of the industry 
to exert real inﬂuence. The outcomes are the result 
of consensus between governments, but very much 
inﬂuenced by the private sector (World Diamond 
Council) and the NGOs. 
• APRM: The inputs are mainly determined by 
governments, while the outcome has to involve 
cooperation between society, the private sector and 
government. The power of the APRM is in the hands 
of heads of state, but the multi-layered nature of the 
organisation gives the APRM some credibility and 
prevents it being seen merely as a tool of government. 
• IKB: The system to guarantee food safety is exacting. 
The power of the government is considerable since 
the public tends to err on the side of caution when 
it comes to what they eat, and interventions to block 
unsafe foodstuﬀs are almost always seen as legitimate. 
The IKB was created to improve the image of the 
sector and to squeeze out operators who were giving 
the industry a bad name. The increasing inﬂuence of 
animal welfare organisations in the IKB led to some 
farmers establishing a new and less constraining 
label, the IKB 2004. From this moment on, the IKB 
functioned as a roundtable in which all actors of the 
chain had an equal stake. Over the years, however, the 
power of the supermarkets has grown progressively, 
due partly to factors extraneous to the industry. 
The key actor in these various sequences is often the 
NGOs, even though the partnerships were government 
or private sector initiated. NGOs exert inﬂuence 
nevertheless, through their public information roles, 
forcing arrangements to be more amenable to them. In 
the APRM and Kimberley, the power of the governments 
was countered by setting up various bodies within the 
partnership. The APRM did this by creating the various 
layers (the panel of eminent Africans is particularly 
inﬂuential). The Kimberley process set up a Participation 
Committee and four working groups in which all 
stakeholders could be active. Interestingly, in the case 
of the IKB, the supermarkets would seem to have taken 
over the role that the NGOs would otherwise play, of 
representing the consumer interest. They also, of course, 
have interests of their own.
4 - Discourses
The discourse of the EU can be summarized simply by 
the statement that ‘TLAS are needed to guarantee that 
only legal timber is traded’.  However, it has been made 
clear that this is only one step in the process of forest 
governance reform, leading to sustainable management 
and pro-poor development. The NGOs agree that 
illegal timber is one of the biggest problems facing the 
forest and they argue that immediate action is needed. 
They therefore value the initiative though they also 
view the VPA as only a step towards sustainable forest 
management, and not an end in itself. Partner countries 
are interested in entering into VPAs to protect their 
market share and the revenues, but some of them fear the 
extra costs of a monitoring system on top of the existing 
regulations. They argue that a green premium is needed, 
to distinguish legal from unveriﬁed timber, although this 
is not necessarily a strong negotiating position (in that it 
implies a legitimate, but discounted, category of timber 
that is ‘not veriﬁed as legal’). So the discourses of the 
various key TLAS actors are not necessarily the same.
• The Kimberley Process: By contrast, the trade in diamonds 
is seen as a common problem that needs a joint solution. 
Despite major diﬀerences in perspective, stakeholders 
share a sense of urgency. The human suﬀering associated 
with the trade in conﬂict diamonds has no natural 
champions, at least not in public arena. NGOs brought 
the issue to the table, but the involvement of the UN 
heightened its proﬁle. Major industries also wanted to 
work on the problem, to head oﬀ a consumer boycott. 
The ‘premium’ in the Kimberley Process lies in its 
exclusivity  (i.e. similar products are no longer traded). 
The problem of the costs for the additional measures to 
guarantee legality has been successfully countered by 
the NGOs (the price mark-up is trivial relative to the 
typical retail sale price). 
• APRM: In this discourse, everybody is theoretically in 
favour of ‘good governance’.  The key problem is the 
implementation. The subject matter of the peer review 
monitoring is not a product or product line but a 
process, and one that should lead to good governance. 
5However, the private sector has been sceptical that the 
APRM will make a diﬀerence and, to date, has been 
cool in its support. On the other hand, civil society, 
the role of which is also critical, has been quite active.
• IKB: In this case, the discourse steers action towards 
its goal: to guarantee safe food, and avoid loss of 
consumer conﬁdence. Although farmers agree that 
food must be safe, they experience the eﬀects of this in 
a negative way: intensive controls, too many rules and 
a controlling body which is altogether too suspicious of 
them. Remarkably, the system they created themselves 
has even more rules and more stringent controls. 
However, they trust this system because they created 
it; this has helped to generate ownership. 
What lessons can be learnt for FLEGT, VPAs and TLAS?
From the review of these case studies, a number of 
conclusions can be drawn which may be of value to the 
design of the TLAS:
Actors 
An important conclusion is that in order to be successful, 
the EU and the potential partner countries need to 
increase their eﬀorts to bring NGOs and private sector on 
board the FLEGT process, as active partners. This might, 
for example, involve linking existing private sector eﬀorts 
to control the trade in illegal timber to the FLEGT/VPA 
process. (Indeed, there is evidence that this is already 
occurring; for example, the Government of Cameroon 
has indicated that it may accept forest certiﬁcation as a 
surrogate for legality.)
Credibility of the monitoring system is a crucial issue. 
In all the other cases, new institutions were created to 
monitor implementation of the agreement.  However, in 
the case of FLEGT, the EU is promoting one speciﬁc 
solution: independent monitoring. This has particular 
connotations in the producer states and consideration 
might be given to alternative instruments to raise 
credibility, particularly peer review. This option deserves 
more attention because it might help to deal with the 
diﬃcult issue of sovereignty.  Whatever arrangement is 
reached, this is likely to be the result of either a process of 
negotiation and discussion between NGOs, governments 
and the private sector, or a system in which NGOs and 
the private sector are both allowed a role. 
Box 2: The three extra-sectoral case studies
3.1 The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)
• A mutually agreed instrument for self-monitoring by the participating member governments of the African Union. 
• Designed to help reinforce good governance in Africa and assess member states’ level of socio-economic 
development. 
• Introduced in 2003, within the framework of NEPAD, as a process to stop Africa’s underdevelopment.
• All countries that sign the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) of the APRM have to create a framework in which 
all national players are involved, meaning government, private sector and civil society.
• Reviews must, in all cases, be followed by an action plan that engages the country in a dynamic to resolve the 
problems that have been identiﬁed.  
• By April 2006, 23 countries had signed the MOU about APRM (Source: http://www.nepad.org/2005/ﬁles/aprmcountries.
php)
• Country review reports available for Ghana and Kenya. Reports of supporting missions within the APRM framework 
also available for Tanzania, Benin, South Africa, Nigeria, Rwanda and Mauritius.
3.2 Kimberley Process 
• Diamonds ﬁrst linked to conﬂict in 1998 by Global Witness, and then raised at the UN Security Council. 
• In 2000, an NGO-led campaign denouncing the bloody associations of this luxury good heavily impacted De Beers, 
which controls 80% of the world’s rough diamonds. This revealed the vulnerability of the industry;
• South Africa initiated a meeting in the town of Kimberley with industry leaders, governments and NGOs in an effort to 
end the phenomenon of ‘conﬂict’ or ‘blood diamonds’, leading to The Kimberley Process Certiﬁcation System (KPCS) 
for rough diamonds. 
• System was agreed whereby governments had to certify the origins of diamonds before they could be exported and 
only trade with Kimberley member countries should take place. 
• Teams made up of government, business and NGO representatives review countries efforts, on a case by case basis.
See: VERIFOR Extrasectoral Case Study No. 1
3.3 Dutch integral chain management certiﬁcate system for pigs or ‘IKB’
• The most important of the 15 private sector, market-driven labels for meat production in the Netherlands, in terms of 
size and impact. 
• Imposes extra controls on pigs, in addition to the government controls, with three levels:
1.  All details of a pig are recorded in a logbook by the individual producer. 
2. Regular controls on certiﬁed producers by the IKB. 
3. Accreditation process, which also has three dimensions: the IKB certiﬁcate, the control body and the IKB organisation. 
All are separately accredited by the Dutch Council for Accreditation (RVA). 
See: VERIFOR Extrasectoral Case Study No. 4
Overseas Development Institute, 111 Westminster Bridge Road, London SE1 7JD
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This paper is an output from a research project funded by the European Union, under its Tropical 
Forestry Budget Line, and the Governments of the Netherlands and Germany. The contents 
of this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors and can in no way be taken to 
reﬂect the views of the ODI, the Government of the Netherlands, Wageningen International, the 
European Union or other donors.
Rules
The comparative cases also show that there are several 
other options to raise the credibility of a partnership, aside 
from its monitoring. It is important to have all important 
stakeholders at the table at the moment of design of the 
system, as only this will create a sense of ownership. 
Consensus seems a strong basis for negotiations. 
Initially, it slows progress, but in the long run it may turn 
out to be an eﬀective principle.  In the cases studied, the 
quality of monitoring varied, both by sector and also 
over time, but the result was sometimes a very strict 
system. Length and frequency of control are aspects 
that should be determined by the stakeholders. 
Clear rules on non-compliance add to the credibility of 
a system. In two of the cases (Kimberley and IKB), the 
ultimate sanction is complete exclusion from the process, 
and from the markets it supports. In the case of the APRM, 
non-compliance may rebound on a country in terms of 
decreased ODA, which is a form of ‘market penalty’. So 
exclusion from the process is a sanction which might 
seriously be considered in the FLEGT case.
Power
In the FLEGT process, many stakeholders are involved, 
but only stakeholders in producing countries are likely to 
be evaluated. This creates an unequal power balance and 
measures may need to be considered to counterbalance 
this. Providing information to stakeholders and giving 
them access to the oﬃcial or unoﬃcial negotiating tables 
are both ways to share power and to increase credibility. 
When it comes to a monitoring system, spreading the 
power over more bodies could increase acceptability and 
decrease the risk of one body getting too much power. 
Again, this points to the value of participatory approaches 
such as peer review. 
The power of consumers (or donors as a proxy for 
consumers) may well be a decisive factor, as shown in the 
case studies. For FLEGT, the consumers are still the ‘sleeping 
giant’ and nobody knows if and when they will wake up. 
  
Discourses
Serious eﬀorts arguably need to be made to harmonize the 
varying discourses on FLEGT, which are hardly conducive 
to joint action. The partners are urgently in need of a 
common problem on which to work together. By contrast, 
what the other cases have in common is a single dominant 
discourse which is morally undeniable. Who does not 
want to ﬁght blood diamonds? Who does not want good 
governance? Who does not want safe food? An important 
question to be asked in the FLEGT/VPA case is: has ‘illegal 
timber’ the same potential to mobilise the general public as 
‘blood diamonds’ or ’unsafe meat’ - or even ‘corruption’ and 
‘bad governance’? A strong and emotional motif is clearly 
an asset in circumstances such as these.
In the FLEGT case, the power of the imagery is 
diminished by lack of clarity of purpose. There are major 
diﬀerences in opinion: is the problem about illegal logging 
or sustainable management of forests? Good governance? 
Poverty alleviation? Conservation of biodiversity?  Is the 
struggle against illegal logging a ﬁrst step or a goal in itself? 
Further debate is needed to clarify these issues and to 
identify some common ground.
Conclusion
Monitoring of the activities of an independent country is a 
demanding task and a matter for great sensitivity. The very 
complicated issue of illegal logging will only be successfully 
addressed if governments, NGOs and the private sector 
work together and generate suﬃcient common ground. 
There is a case for much greater involvement of NGOs and 
the private sector in the FLEGT process and in the design 
and implementation of its veriﬁcation systems.
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